Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics

Class: PHIL-282

Notes:

I Chapters 7-10, 13

Ch. 7

Why is happiness better than virtues such as honor and understanding?
Happiness is better because it is chosen always for itself and never for the sake of anything else, while virtues like honor and understanding are sometimes chosen for their own sake—but also for the sake of being happy. People pursue honor or understanding because they believe these things will bring them happiness, but no one seeks happiness as a means to something else. Thus, happiness is the most final and complete good

How does Aristotle explain the self-sufficiency that accompanies happiness?
Aristotle explains that the self-sufficiency of happiness means it makes life desirable and lacking in nothing, not just for a single person in isolation but also for one’s family, friends, and community. Happiness is self-sufficient because it is the one thing that, by itself, makes life complete and fulfilling. Nothing needs to be added to happiness to make it more desirable.

How does Aristotle derive the function of the human? What is the conclusion of the argument presented that starts with this as a premise?
Aristotle reasons that, just as a flute-player or sculptor has a characteristic function, so must humans as a species. The unique function of humans, Aristotle claims, is the rational activity of the soul—living according to reason. Performing this function well, in accordance with virtue, is where the human “good” lies. His argument concludes that the good for humans is “activity of the soul in conformity with excellence or virtue”—and this activity, done well and over a complete life, is happiness.

What are three ways by which first principles can be studied?
Aristotle identifies three ways of approaching first principles: some acquire them by habit and upbringing, some through divine dispensation or intuition, and some through learning and reasoning. He notes that these starting points for reasoning cannot always be proven by argument but can originate in different parts of the soul or through different life experiences.

Ch. 8

Into which three categories are goods divided?

• Goods are divided into external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul.
• Goods of the soul are considered the most genuine and especially good.

Must virtue be actualized?

• Yes, virtue must be put into action; having virtue is not enough—happiness requires the activity of the soul in line with virtue, not merely possessing virtue as a potential.

How do external goods factor into happiness?

• External goods (like wealth, friends, and political power) are needed as instruments to perform virtuous actions; without some external goods, it is difficult or impossible to act excellently or live fully happy. A lack of certain external goods (such as good birth, children, or beauty) can seriously limit one’s happiness.

Ch. 9

What two aspects must be complete for happiness to exist?

• Happiness needs to be both complete in activity and in duration—that is, living a full and active life of virtue over a complete lifetime, not just a single moment or short period.
• A truly happy life is assessed over its entirety, considering the individual’s consistent virtuous activity, and not merely good fortune or fleeting emotions.

Ch. 10

Explain the puzzle of death and happiness that Aristotle considers.

• Aristotle questions whether someone can be called truly happy before death, since fortune can change and affect one’s life afterward; some only gain or lose happiness posthumously due to their descendants’ fates.
• The puzzle is whether happiness is secure and stable, or if it can only be judged at the end of life, echoing the proverb “call no man happy until he is dead”.

What adjectives are used to describe a soul who perseveres in virtue in spite of poor fortune?

• Aristotle describes such a soul as noble, great, and truly good or finely steadfast; this person endures misfortune with dignity and never becomes miserable, showing “good character and greatness of soul”.

Ch. 13

On what topic should the true politician spend most effort, and what sort of knowledge is needed?

• True politicians should focus especially on the cultivation of virtue in citizens’ souls. This requires understanding of both moral and intellectual character.
• They need knowledge of the soul’s structure and how virtue is shaped so they can guide the formation of good habits and character.

What are the two parts into which Aristotle divides the soul (1102a30)? Are both shaped by reason?

• The soul is divided into a rational part and a nonrational part. The nonrational part itself has two sections: the vegetative/nutritive side, shared with plants, and the appetitive/impulse side, shared with animals but responsive to reason.
• Only the appetitive side of the nonrational soul can be influenced by reason (by habit and training), while the nutritive part cannot. The rational part is shaped directly by reason, so both are engaged, but in different ways.

II Chapters 1-7

Ch. 1

Between which two sorts of virtue does Aristotle distinguish?
Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual virtues and moral (character) virtues. Intellectual virtues arise and develop mainly through teaching, time, and experience, while moral virtues are acquired through habit (from the Greek word ethos), meaning repeated practice and habituation in action.

How are nature and habit related to virtues?
Virtues are not born in us by nature, nor contrary to nature—instead, humans have the natural capacity to acquire them, but this capacity is realized only through habit and training. For example, it is not human nature alone that makes someone just or brave; it is by repeatedly doing just or brave actions that a person becomes virtuous. Thus, nature gives the power to receive virtue, but actual virtue results from habitual activity.

Ch. 2

What does Aristotle say the aim studying virtue is?
Aristotle says the aim of studying virtue is not just to know what virtue is, but to become good by practicing it—to develop character and become virtuous in life, not just in theory. The end goal is action and the cultivation of excellence, not mere intellectual understanding.

Virtues are “destroyed” by which two extremes?
Virtues are destroyed by excess and deficiency—that is, by going too far or not far enough in feeling or action. Aristotle describes virtue as the mean or intermediate state, and warns that either too much or too little destroys virtue, while the mean preserves it.

Ch. 3

What must be considered in addition to actions when assessing virtue?
When assessing virtue, the state of the agent’s character and intention must also be considered—not just the actions performed. Aristotle states that virtuous acts must be:

• Done knowingly,
• Chosen for their own sake,
• Flow from a stable, virtuous disposition.
In other words, a truly virtuous person not only performs good actions but does so knowingly, for the right reasons, and out of a consistent character.
• Pleasures and Pains

What does Aristotle name as the three objects of choice?
Aristotle names the noble (the fine or honorable), the advantageous (the useful), and the pleasant as the three objects of choice. These are the things for which people generally act or make decisions, as contrasted with their opposites—the base, the harmful, and the painful.

Ch. 4

What is the impasse that Aristotle thinks could be raised about his account of virtues?
Aristotle anticipates the objection that if performing virtuous actions makes a person virtuous, then anyone who happens to do a virtuous deed (even once or by chance) would be considered virtuous. He clarifies that virtue is not simply about doing the right action, but about doing it knowingly, willingly, and from a firm and stable character—like how being a good musician is not just about producing good music by accident or external guidance, but from one’s own skill.

What are the three characteristics of virtuous action enumerated near 1104a30?
Near 1104a30, Aristotle lists three conditions required for an action to count as truly virtuous:

1. The agent must know what they are doing.
2. The agent must choose the act, and choose it for its own sake.
3. The act must come from a firm and stable character (a settled disposition).

What does Aristotle consider the aim of philosophy, and why do many not reach it?
Aristotle states that the aim of philosophy is not mere knowledge of virtue, but to develop a good character and live virtuously. Many do not reach this aim because they stop at theoretical understanding without translating it into habitual practice and action—the true end is living well, not just knowing what “living well” is.

• "Those sick people who listen to the doctors carefully but do none of the things they order"

Ch. 5

Aristotle says there are three types of things that come to be present in the soul. What are they, and which has to do with virtue?

1. Feelings: These are feelings such as desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, emulation, and pity—basically, emotions that are accompanied by pleasure or pain.
2. Predispositions: These are our natural capacities or abilities to feel these emotions, such as the ability to become angry or feel pity.
3. Active conditions: These are the settled dispositions that determine how we respond to emotions—whether we are well or badly regulated with respect to our feelings (e.g., moderate or excessive anger).

Virtue specifically belongs to the third category: it is a state of character (habit/disposition), not an emotion or a mere capacity. This is because people are praised or blamed for how they manage emotions, not for feeling them or just having the capacity to do so.

Ch. 6

What example does Aristotle use to illustrate the desired mean?
Aristotle famously uses courage as an example of the desired mean. Courage is the virtue that lies between the two extremes (vices) of rashness (excess) and cowardice (deficiency). Courage involves the right amount of fear and confidence in facing danger—neither too much fear (cowardice) nor too little (rashness).

What are the five components of the definition of virtue?
Aristotle defines virtue as a state that:

1. Decides (it is a disposition that involves choice, not a feeling or capacity),
2. Lies in a mean (relative to us, between excess and deficiency),
3. Is determined by reason (the mean is defined with reference to rational principle),
4. That rational principle is the one that a wise person would use to determine it,
5. And this mean is relative to us, meaning it may vary based on the individual and circumstances.

What examples are given of feelings and actions that do not admit of the mean?
Aristotle notes that some feelings and actions do not have a mean because they are inherently wrong or irrational. Examples include shame, envy, spite, and malice, these are always bad and have no virtuous middle ground. Similarly, some pleasures like debauchery and actions like theft or adultery do not admit of a mean because they are naturally vicious and cannot be “moderate” or virtuous in any degree.

Ch. 7

Note the deficiencies and excesses for the different particular virtues listed in this chapter.
In Book II, Chapter 7 of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle lists various particular virtues and identifies their associated deficiencies and excesses (vices). Here are some examples:

Each virtue lies between two extremes—either one involves too little or too much of a particular quality or action. Aristotle emphasizes the importance of hitting the mean relative to the individual and situation

V

BOOK V: JUSTICE (Ch 1-8)

Chapter 1: General Justice (The Whole of Virtue)

• Definition: Justice/Injustice concerns active conditions (hexeis) leading people to perform just/unjust actions and want what is just/unjust.
• Distinction: Justice and injustice are meant in more than one sense (the ambiguity escapes notice because the meanings are closely related).
• The unjust person is characterized as a lawbreaker and greedy/inequitable. They are greedy for more of what is "simply good".
• In one sense, justice is complete virtue, but specifically in relation to someone else.
  • This is why justice seems the greatest of the virtues, embodying all virtue together in one.
  • It differs from virtue only in aspect: it is virtue insofar as it relates to another person.
• The law aims at the common advantage or the advantage of the best people.

Chapter 2: Particular Justice (A Part of Virtue)

• Inquiry focuses on justice/injustice as a part of overall virtue.
• Particular injustice results from taking more than one's due (greed), and is often distinct from other vices (e.g., adultery for profit is unjust, but adultery from desire is merely dissipated).
• This partial justice concerns gain, honor, money, and safety.
• The inequitable is a part of the unlawful; everything inequitable is unlawful, but not everything unlawful is inequitable.
• This particular justice is divided into distributive justice and rectificatory justice (setting things straight in transactions).

Chapter 3: Distributive Justice

• What is just is equitable.
• Justice is a mean and must involve at least four things (two people and two portions).
• Distribution must be in accordance with merit (merit is defined by the type of constitution: freedom in democracy, wealth in oligarchy, virtue in aristocracy).
• Distributive justice is a geometrical proportion (equality of ratios).
• Injustice in this sense is disproportionate.

Chapter 4: Corrective Justice

• This justice handles both willing and unwilling transactions.
• It operates according to an arithmetic proportion, treating the involved persons as equals, focusing only on the difference arising from the harm.
• The judge intervenes to equalize the injustice (an inequality) by imposing a penalty, taking away the "gain" from the wrongdoer.
• This justice is the mean between loss and gain.
• The judge is described as a sort of "ensouled justice".

Chapter 5: Justice and Reciprocity

• Justice is not simply reciprocity (suffering what one did) because proportional differences often exist (e.g., authority striking a subordinate).
• In exchange (which holds a community together), justice requires reciprocity by proportionality.
• Currency (money) is introduced as a measure to make things commensurable (comparable).
• Currency functions as a conventional substitute for need.
• Justice is defined as a mean quantity, differing from the other virtues (which are a mean condition).
• Doing injustice is having an excess of something good, while having injustice done to one is having a deficiency.

Chapter 6: Political Justice and Willing Acts

• Political justice is found among people who share a life aiming at self-sufficiency and who are free and equal.
• We allow the law to rule, not a human being, because a human ruler would inevitably claim more than his due and become a tyrant.
• The ruler is a guardian of what is just.
• There is no simple injustice toward things that are one's own, such as a child (until independent) or a slave.

Chapter 7: Natural vs. Conventional Justice

• Political justice is composed of a natural kind and a conventional kind.
• Natural justice has the same power everywhere, regardless of opinion (e.g., fire burns everywhere).
• Conventional justice is set down by human law, and while indifferent at first (e.g., setting a ransom price), it makes a difference once established.
• An act of injustice is defined as an unjust thing done willingly.

Chapter 8: The Act of Injustice

• Doing injustice requires a willing act (knowing whom, with what, and how).
• An unwilling act happens either by force or from ignorance of particulars.
• Harms resulting from willing acts without deliberate choice (e.g., acts from passion/spiritedness) are categorized as wrongs.
• One is an unjust person only when the harm comes from choice.
• Wrongs done as a result of ignorance are forgivable; those from unnatural and inhuman passion are not forgivable.

Summary

VI

Reading Questions for Nicomachean Ethics Book VI

1. In this book, Aristotle turns from virtues of character to those of thought. What are the two
   parts in which he subdivides the rational part of the soul (1139a6)? What is the virtue of both
   “thinking” parts of the soul (1139b13)?
2. What is the relationship between action, choice, desire, and thinking (1139a32 ff.)?
3. Aristotle now starts the investigation again from a different angle, namely the five powers by
   which the soul discloses truth by affirming and denying. Define and find what is similar and
   different in each of the five powers of the soul:
   • knowledge (episteme; chapter 3),
   • art (techne; chapter 4),
   • practical judgment (phronesis; chapter 5),
   • intellect (nous; chapter 6), and
   • wisdom (sophia; chapter 7).
   [Note that all but art are defined in the Sachs’s glossary.]
   [Skip or skim chapter 8]
4. Note the definition of skilled deliberation, given at 1142b28. [Sachs’s translation is “a
   rightness that results from what is beneficial in the end for which, the means by which, and the
   time in which it ought to occur.”]
   [Skip or skim chapter 10]
   [If you read chapter 11, focus on bolstering your understandings/definitions of prudence and
   wisdom.]
5. In chapter 12, pay attention to Aristotle’s analysis of cleverness and shame (1144a23ff.).
   [If you read chapter 13, focus on the relationship of prudence to the virtues.]

VII

Reading Questions on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book VII

Ch. 1

Ch. 1. Note that most of the chapter consists of Aristotle explaining different commonly held views.

What are the main distinctions that will be made in Book VII?
The main distinctions that will be made are:

1. Self-control (enkrateia) vs. lack of self-control (akrasia)
   • Aristotle will distinguish between people who have control over their appetites and desires, and those who lack control and give in to pleasures against their better judgment.
2. Softness (malakia) vs. endurance (karteria)
   • Closely related, he introduces the contrast between people who are easily pained and give way (softness), versus those who can endure hardships and difficulties (endurance).
3. Bestiality (thēriotēs) vs. divinity (superhuman virtue)
   • He notes that there are extremes beyond the human: people who fall below humanity into “bestiality,” and those who rise above the human condition toward “divine” or “heroic” virtue.
4. Pleasures: natural vs. unnatural
   • Aristotle highlights that some pleasures are natural (e.g., food, drink, sex in moderation), while others are unnatural or corrupt (e.g., cannibalism, excessive indulgence). This sets up his later analysis of how pleasures relate to self-control and lack of it.

So, the chapter establishes the framework for analyzing moral weakness and strength—where humans fall when struggling with pleasures and pains, and how this differs from both sub-human excess and super-human virtue.

Ch. 2

Ch. 2. "Note that most of the chapter consists of Aristotle explaining different commonly held “impasses.”"

What did Socrates think about knowledge and self-restraint?

• Socrates held the view that no one truly acts against what they know.

• For him, knowledge is sufficient for virtue: if someone does the wrong thing, it must be because they were ignorant at that moment of what was truly good.

• Therefore, what people call “lack of self-restraint” (akrasia)—knowing the better choice but doing the worse—does not really exist. Instead, it’s just a case of not having knowledge in the proper, active sense.

  Aristotle disagrees, noting that people do sometimes act against what they know, though he will explain it by distinguishing between different ways of “having” knowledge (as active or inactive, like someone reciting verses but not really applying them).

Why does Aristotle say that there is forgiveness for lack of self-restraint, but “there is no forgiveness for vice” (1146a4)?

• Vice (kakia) is a settled condition of character. A vicious person chooses badly with full intention and sees bad actions as good. There’s no excuse here, because their reasoning and desires are aligned in the wrong way.
• Lack of self-restraint (akrasia), on the other hand, is more like weakness or conflict: the person knows the right thing but fails to act on it due to overpowering desire. They at least recognize the good but fail to follow through.
• Because of this, Aristotle says we forgive the weak person more easily than the vicious person—since weakness is a failure of strength, not a corruption of the whole character.

Ch. 3

Ch 3. Define “dissipation” in your own words. What is the difference between it and unrestraint? "Skip Ch. 4 and Ch 5: just answer this question using footnote 195 and the glossary".

"Dissipation"

• Dissipation (akolasia) is a settled condition of character where someone habitually seeks excessive pleasures and avoids pains without restraint.
• A dissipated person chooses wrongly on purpose: they see the wrong pleasures as good and pursue them consistently.

What is the difference between temperance, dissipation, and unrestraint?

• Temperance (sōphrosynē): the virtue. Desires are moderate and in harmony with reason; takes pleasures in the right way, at the right time, in the right amount.
• Dissipation: permanent and intentional — the person’s values are corrupted. They approve of excessive pleasure as good.
• Unrestraint (akrasia): weakness of will — the person knows the right choice and even wants to do it, but desire overpowers them in the moment. Their reasoning is still correct, but they fail to follow it.

Ch. 6

"Skip Ch. 6, which has to do with lack of restraint in spiritedness (anger) or toward desires."

Ch. 7

Ch. 7. What is the difference of unrestraint on account of impetuousness and weakness? (1150b20)

Unrestraint from Weakness

• This happens when a person knows the right thing, thinks it through, but fails to act because their desires overpower them.
• The reasoning process is completed, but in the end, appetite wins.
• Example: Someone decides not to eat cake because it’s unhealthy, but when the cake is in front of them, they can’t resist.

Unrestraint from Impetuousness

• This happens when a person acts without giving reason time to deliberate.
• The fault is not that desire defeats reason, but that the person rushes into action before reason can even speak.
• Example: Someone grabs the cake immediately without pausing to recall their decision to avoid sweets.

Ch. 8

Ch. 8. What is the difference between an unrestrained person and one who is dissipated? Why is the former better?

Difference between an Unrestrained Person and a Dissipated Person

• Unrestrained Person (akratēs):
  • Knows what is right and actually wants the good.
  • But in moments of temptation, their desires overpower their reason.
  • They act wrongly against their better judgment, but they still believe that what they are doing is wrong.
• Dissipated Person (akolastos):
  • Has a corrupted character: they think excessive pleasures are good and pursue them deliberately.
  • Their reasoning itself is distorted — they don’t even judge their actions as wrong.
  • Their vice is settled and chosen, not just a lapse.

Why the Unrestrained Person is Better

• The unrestrained person at least still recognizes the good and wishes for it, even if they fail to live up to it. Their reason is intact, but their strength of will is lacking.
• The dissipated person, by contrast, is worse because their reasoning is spoiled — they approve of bad desires as good. This makes them less likely to improve, since they don’t even see the need for correction.

Ch. 9

Ch. 9. Why is the temperate person better than one who practices self-restraint?

Self-Restraint (enkrateia)

• A self-restrained person has bad desires, but resists them.
• They do the right thing, but only by struggling against themselves.
• Their reason and desire are in conflict, and reason wins.

Temperance (sōphrosynē)

• A temperate person’s desires are already in harmony with reason.
• They want the right things, in the right amounts, at the right times.
• No inner conflict — they enjoy moderation naturally.

Why the Temperate Person is Better

• The self-restrained person is praiseworthy because they master their desires.
• But the temperate person is superior because they don’t need to fight desires at all: their appetites have been trained to align with reason.
• In other words, temperance shows a better moral state—not just controlling bad impulses, but having good impulses to begin with.

Ch. 10

Ch. 10. Why can the same person not have practical judgment and be self-restrained?

• Practical judgment (phronēsis) is more than knowing rules; it’s the virtue of seeing truly what is good in particular situations and acting on it. A person with phronēsis has their desires and reasoning in full alignment — they don’t just know, they live by that knowledge.
• Self-restraint (enkrateia) implies conflict: the person has bad or excessive desires but resists them by holding to reason. Their reasoning is right, but their appetites still pull the other way.
• For Aristotle, this is a contradiction:
  • If someone really has phronēsis, they would not have desires opposed to right reason in the first place — their whole character would be ordered around what’s truly good.
  • So, a person who needs self-restraint shows that they lack full phronēsis. They might have cleverness or correct opinion, but not the perfected virtue of practical wisdom.

In short:

• Phronēsis = unified soul → right reason + right desire.
• Self-restraint = divided soul → right reason vs. wrong desire.
• Therefore, the same person cannot truly have phronēsis and at the same time need self-restraint.

Ch. 11-14

Ch. 11–14. Identify an important claim about the relation of pleasure to flourishing from each chapter. Pay attention to the footnotes.

Ch. 11 – Pleasure is not simply a process (1152b–1153a)

• Important claim: Pleasure is not a “coming-to-be” but an activity.
• Some argued pleasure is like a process (heating up, growing, etc.), but Aristotle rejects that. Pleasure is instead a completion of activity, like seeing well or thinking clearly.
• This matters for flourishing because pleasure is bound up with living activities, not with external additions.

Ch. 12 – Pleasure perfects activity (1153a14–1153b26)

• Important claim: Pleasure “completes” an activity, like a bloom on a flower.
• Each activity has its proper pleasure (e.g., thinking has its own pleasure, as does exercising).
• Activities are made better and more enduring when accompanied by their natural pleasures — which shows that pleasure is not opposed to flourishing but enhances it.

Ch. 13 – Pleasures differ in kind (1153b–1154a)

• Important claim: Not all pleasures are good — they differ according to the activity they perfect.
• Noble activities have noble pleasures, base activities have base pleasures.
• Thus, a flourishing life is not about more pleasure, but about the right kinds of pleasure — those aligned with virtue.

Ch. 14 – Pleasure belongs to the good life (1154a–1154b)

• Important claim: The best human life (eudaimonia) must include pleasure, but of the right sort.
• Happiness is activity in accord with virtue, and since pleasure naturally crowns such activity, a flourishing life will necessarily be pleasant in a deep sense.
• Aristotle argues against those who say pleasure is bad: the pleasures of virtuous activity are central to living well.

In short:

VIII

Friendship (philia)

Ch. 1 — Why friendship matters

• Friendship is necessary for life: no one would choose to live without friends, even with all other goods.
• It’s crucial for cities and households (holds communities together) and for the young (guidance) and old (care).
• Friendship is also noble (kalon): we praise loving rather than being loved.
• Sets up: investigate its kinds, causes, and features.

Ch. 2 — What friendship is

• Friendship requires:

  1. Goodwill (eunoia): wishing good to another for the other’s sake,
  2. Reciprocity, and
  3. Awareness of that reciprocity.

• Mere liking or one-sided admiration isn’t friendship until it’s mutual and acknowledged.

• Loving (actively wishing good) is more decisive than being loved.

Ch. 3 — The three bases of love

• We love the useful, the pleasant, or the good (noble/virtuous).
• Therefore, three species of friendship:
  • Utility: for advantage.
  • Pleasure: for enjoyment.
  • Virtue (the good): for the friend’s character itself.

Ch. 4 — Imperfect vs. perfect friendships

• Utility and Pleasure friendships are incidental (you love what you get, not who they are); they change when the benefit or delight changes.
• Perfect friendship: between good people alike in virtue, who love each other for each other, as stable characters.
  • Requires time and habit (living together, sharing life).
  • Rare.

Ch. 5 — Age and temperament differences

• Young: prone to pleasure-friendships (quick to start, quick to end as tastes change).
• Old: often utility-friendships (for service/aid).
• Prudent/mature: more capable of virtue-friendship (stable evaluation of character).

Ch. 6 — Mixing bases & stability

• Mixed motives are common (some pleasure + some utility), but the dominant basis dictates stability.
• Friendship endures if each gets what he “signed up for.”
• Misunderstandings arise when the terms are unclear (one expects pleasure, another expects utility).

Ch. 7 — Loving “for the friend’s sake”

• To love a friend well is to will and do goods for them as such (not as a means).
• In perfect friendship, each sees the friend as another self; goodwill becomes active beneficence.
• Equality in loving matters more than equality in receiving.

Ch. 8 — Conflicts & complaints

• Complaints occur mostly in non-equal bases (utility/pleasure): each thinks he gives more than he gets.
• Rule: judge by the original ground of the friendship—deliver what belongs to that kind (don’t expect noble devotion from a merely commercial tie).
• In virtue-friendship, complaints are rare: each aims at the friend’s good

Ch. 9 — Unequal friendships & proportionality

• Many friendships are unequal (in virtue, honor, wealth, age).
• Justice is preserved by proportional exchange: the “greater” gives according to his superiority (e.g., care/honor), the “lesser” returns in his way (e.g., gratitude, respect).
• Like-for-like equality isn’t always possible; aim at fitting proportionality.

Ch. 10 — Measures of return

• In utility-friendships: treat the use as the measure—repay what was intended (not what the helper happened to provide).
• In pleasure-friendships: measure by the agreed pleasure; if it stops being pleasant, parting isn’t an injustice if expectations were clear.
• Promises vs. deserts: repay what was reasonably expected given the friendship’s basis.

Ch. 11 — Special ties: benefactors & honored roles

• A benefactor may love more than the recipient (like an artist loves his work): one loves what one causes.
• Parents–children, host–guest, teacher–student: have distinct duties; equality again is by proportion, not sameness.

Ch. 12 — Friendship, justice, and household relations

• Kinds of rule mirror kinds of friendship and justice:
  • Father–child (monarchic): love with care and reverence.
  • Husband–wife (aristocratic/partnership): shared rule, distinct virtues.
  • Master–servant (despotic): minimal friendship (as far as common life allows).
• As justice varies with forms of association, so does friendship’s shape.

Ch. 13 — Constitutions & civic friendship

• Political constitutions correspond to forms of friendship:
  • Kingship ↔ paternal-like goodwill;
  • Aristocracy ↔ proportional equality among the worthy;
  • Timocracy/Polity ↔ civic comradeship among equals.
• Deviant regimes distort friendship:
  • Tyranny destroys civic friendship;
  • Oligarchy/ Democracy map to partial forms (friendship among the few vs. among equals).
• Concord (homonoia) in a city is a kind of political friendship: agreement on practical matters of common good.

Ch. 14 — Civic friendship among fellow citizens

• Citizens share common advantage, laws, and life; so there is a civic form of friendship built on concord and justice.
• Best regimes foster friendship by habituating citizens to virtue and shared ends; worst regimes pit groups against each other.

Core takeaways (one-page recap)

• Definition: Friendship = reciprocated, known goodwill aimed at the friend for their own sake.
• Three kinds: Utility, Pleasure, Virtue (only the last is perfect and stable).
• Stability: Tracks the object loved—what’s incidental (use/pleasure) changes; character (virtue) is stable.
• Equality: Not always sameness—often proportional (fit to roles, deserts, and aims).
• Measure of justice in friendships: deliver what belongs to the friendship’s basis and original expectations.
• Household & city: Forms of rule and constitutions shape corresponding friendship patterns. Good regimes nurture concord; bad regimes erode friendship.
• Ideal: Virtue-friendship—two good people loving the good in each other, sharing life and activity over time.

Chapter 1
Aristotle begins EN by saying “Every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action or
choice, seems to aim at some good, and hence it has been beautifully said that the good is
that at which all things aim.” Look up the word “end,” corresponding to the Greek telos,
in the glossary.
Look up “being at work,” corresponding to the Greek energeia, in the Glossary. How
does this end relate to “works produced?”
What is the relationship between the ends of master arts and their constituent ends?
Chapter 2
What analogy does Aristotle use to express his claim that our aim should be the best
good?
Which “master art” does he say deserves preeminence? Why?
Chapter 3
Does Aristotle think ethics permits a certain, universal discussion?
Why are youth unsuitable students of political science?
Chapter 4
What is the name of the highest good pursued? Read the definition of this term in the
glossary, and make a note of its Greek translation, which we will use in class.
Aristotle distinguishes between “arguments from principles” and “arguments to
principles.” What terms do we use for these types of arguments? Which does he say is
appropriate for trying to understand the highest good?
Chapter 5
Aristotle differentiates between three types of lives that aim for this good. What are
they?
What shortcomings does he list for two of these lives?
Chapter 6 [skip]
What does piety require philosophers to do?
Why Aristotle thinks that either no single Form of the universal good exists, or if so, it is
futile?

Book II
Chapter 1
Between which two sorts of virtue does Aristotle distinguish?
How are nature and habit related to virtues?
Chapter 2
What does Aristotle say the aim studying virtue is?
Virtues are “destroyed” by which two extremes?
Chapter 3
What must be considered in addition to actions when assessing virtue?
What does Aristotle name as the three objects of choice?
Chapter 4
What is the impasse that Aristotle thinks could be raised about his account of virtues?
What are the three characteristics of virtuous action enumerated near 1104a30?
What does Aristotle consider the aim of philosophy, and why do many not reach it?
Chapter 5
Aristotle says there are three types of things that come to be present in the soul. What are
they, and which has to do with virtue?
Chapter 6
What example does Aristotle use to illustrate the desired mean?
Sachs translation
What are the five components of the definition of virtue?
What examples are given of feelings and actions that do not admit of the mean?
Chapter 7
Note the deficiencies and excesses for the different particular virtues listed in this
chapter.